Patrones de transferencia de tecnología entre empresas matrices, filiales y rivalessu efecto sobre la competencia

  1. Mendi Güemes, Pedro
  2. Moner Colonques, Rafael
  3. Sempere Monerris, José Jorge
Journal:
Economía industrial

ISSN: 0422-2784

Year of publication: 2011

Issue Title: Fuentes y efectos económicos de la innovación

Issue: 382

Pages: 93-100

Type: Article

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More publications in: Economía industrial

Abstract

This paper provides a quantitative view of the international market for technology, in which most of the transfers happen within multinational firms by means of royalty based contracts. We develop a competition model where one of the firms, partially owned by a multinational firm that holds a process innovation, has been transferred the technology. When the affiliated firm is the most efficient one in the market, a higher share implies the rival of the affiliated firm paying positive and greater royalties in more cases and so the multinational can control the intensity of competition

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