Acción humana y disposición de ánimo desde la perspectiva fenomenológica (Alexander Pfänder, Dietrich von Hildebrand y Max Scheler)

Resumo

The thesis is entitled "Human action and mood from the phenomenological perspective (Alexander Pfänder, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Max Scheler)." Basically there are these two notions (human action and mood) that have divided the work into two parts. The first human action and freedom, the second on the mood and the subjective ground of human action. The phenomenology of the authors discussed has been very rewarding as far as the field of action is concerned. I think she has been the lifeline of philosophy, especially ethics, the twentieth century, and why not the years that follow, therefore, has fought the prevailing relativism and psychologism in recent years with extraordinary strength with an almost unparalleled scientific finesse. The anti-psychologism of thinkers have been addressed either one of the threads of the work. (Here is reflected the meaning of the first chapter of the thesis: Reason for phenomenology of action). To study human action, the realist phenomenology presented here addressed, always following the fruitful thought of the thinkers of Munich, the framework and elements of the action together with the notion of value, key phenomenological ethics. This presentation seemed not only appropriate but necessary to lay the foundations of research. (Here lies the meaning of the second chapter: Mark and elements of the action). Having seen the framework, the elements of action and the meaning of bravery in action, we present what is, strictly speaking, the analysis of the action, since its inception, anchored in the desire to the action itself. The port that arrived with this third chapter is the core of the conclusions of this first part, namely, that human action is not a case basis, but a reason. That is, the objective bases of human action, from the phenomenological prism, is or are the reasons. The second part of the research presents two chapters. The first of these studies the notion of mood in the authors discussed. It is here, at first, to establish convergence and divergence about the notion of Gesinnung in the three authors. Then after seeing the idea, the reader concludes that it is the motor of human action, subjective ground, and on the other hand, we hardly are emerging differences between the authors on this notion. Perhaps the most notorious is establishing between Pfänder and Scheler, since the first calls for a plurality of Gesinnungen, while the second supports a single Grundgesinnung, there is only one direction of fundamental value. Such a divergence does not seem major, since it undermines any of the two positions; there is no serious inconsistency in assuming both positions. What does seem relevant is the contribution Scheler on the modification of the Gesinnung through the concept of monitoring, a concept that opens the door to ethical personalism, as well solid foundation to speak of the moral person. The last chapter attempts to capture the wealth of anthropological possessing the above. The mood, when motor action, being impregnated with the whole person, in each act, is telling us much of what we are, specifically what is the moral person. To view the impoverished scope that history has given to the ethical personalism which we refer to the anthropological field, has been very necessary to make a comparison with the most influential anthropology of the last follow: anthropology Heideggerian existential dye. However, we believe that this thesis "has met" with a dual basis, thanks to the method used. It is, at bottom, a single foundation, the foundation of moral action in two aspects: the objective (reasons) and subjective (the mood).