Identity and conflicts in the ethics of neural implants
ISSN: 1132-1989, 2386-3773
Year of publication: 2014
Issue Title: Posthumano, más que humano
Volume: 25
Issue: 85
Pages: 415-426
Type: Article
More publications in: Cuadernos de bioética
Abstract
The development of neuroprosthetics has given rise to significant theoretical and practical challenges concerning personal identity. The Extended Mind Theory (EMT) attempts to provide an answer to these challenges by arguing that the mind and the external world are co-extensive to the point that both can make a seamless unified entity. The EMT also proposes that physical states determine the nature of mental states. Here, we propose a non-deterministic and less locationist view of mental states that we will call iEMT. The iEMT articulates, firstly, that the co-extensivity of the mind and the world does not justify the dissolution of the mind in the objects of the external world with which the mind interacts. Consequently, the agent’s mind is still part of his unique personal identity. Secondly, neural implants cannot be regarded as mere replacement parts in the context of a weak concept of personal identity. Thirdly, there are no com - pelling reasons to believe or to fear that neuroprosthetics can alter personal identity at the profound level
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