El nuevo argumento de Penrose y la no-localidad de la conciencia
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Universidad de Navarra
info
ISSN: 0031-4749, 2386-5822
Year of publication: 2022
Volume: 78
Issue: 298
Pages: 337-350
Type: Article
More publications in: Pensamiento: Revista de investigación e Información filosófica
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Abstract
In 1989 Roger Penrose formulated an argument against AI. This argument concludes that the scientific-mathematical explanation of reality is broader than the merely computational, because there are certain non-computational aspects of reality. This article analyzes the argument and the discussion about it, to conclude that the type of argument that Penrose wants to develop is tainted at the root, what prevents reaching the wished conclusions. At the same time the philosophical validity of his conclusions is maintained and the idea of non-locality is pointed as sound when speaking about consciousness.
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