Libertad y necesidad

Referencias bibliográficas

• Así, por ejemplo, en el ensayo con este mismo título de A. AYER, Freedom and Necessity, en IDEM, Philosophical Essays (Macmillan, London, 1954) pp. 271-284
• Sobre los orígenes históricos de esta perspectiva hoy dominante, vid. R. GLAUSER, La problèmatique de la causalité et de la liberté dans la philosophie du XVIIe siècle: une présentation, "Revue Philosophique de Louvain" 107/4 (2009) pp. 559-565
• y J. A. HARRIS, Of Liberty and Necessity (Clarendon, Oxford, 2005)
• Un repaso histórico general puede encontrarse en R. WEATHERFORD, The Implications of Determinism (Routledge, London, 1991) Part One, pp. 1-169
• Cf. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XXX
• Cf. una selección representative en G. WATSON (ed.), Free Will (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003)
• La bibliografía al respecto es, en todo caso, inabarcable, con 5.000 títulos recogidos en el repertorio más actualizado, que renuncia de entrada a ser exhaustivo: N. RESCHER; E. BURRIS, Free Will: An Extensive Bibliography (Ontos, Frankfurt, 2010)
• Cf., por ejemplo, TH. TALBOTT, God, Freedom, and Human Agency, "Faith and Philosophy" 26/4 (2009) pp. 378-397
• y T. PAWL; K. TIMPE, Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven, "Faith and Philosophy" ibidem, pp. 398-419
• THOMAS DE AQUINO, Super Rom., cap. 2 1. 3 n. 8: "iste est supremus gradus dignitatis in hominibus, ut scilicet non ab aliis, sed a seipsis inducantur ad bonum"
• AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, De civitate Dei, lib. 5 cap. 10 n. 1
• Cf. De natura et gratia, cap. 47 n. 55
• Enchiridion de fide, spe et charitate, cap. 28, n. 105
• THOMAS DE AQUINO, Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 15 q. 4 a. 1 qc. 3 ad 1
• De veritate, q. 22 a. 6 co
• e incluso Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 19 a. 10 co
• Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 62 a. 8 ad 3; q. 82 a. 1
• De potentia, q. 10 a. 2 ad 5
• Seguirá esta doctrina madura F. SUÁREZ, Disputationes Metaphysicae, disp. 19, sect. 2, n. 21
• G. DE TOCCO, Ystoria sancti Thome de Aquino (PIMS, Toronto, 1996) cap. 40, p. 169: "opiniones et rationes, quas adhuc baccelarius adinuenit, paucis exceptis, magister effectus scripsit, tenuit et defendit"
• Entre ambas - justo en la q. 22 a. 10 -, cesa la copia dictada directamente por Sto. Tomás a sus secretarios, conservada en el códice Vaticano latino 781: cf. A. DONDAINE, Secrétaires de Saint Thomas (Editori di S. Tommaso, Roma, 1956) pp. 99 ss. El hecho invita a una pregunta que probablemente nunca podremos responder: ¿fue una pausa para meditar con mayor sosiego?
• B. SPINOZA, Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, pars I def. 7. Cf. prop. 17 coroll. 2
• La libertad en Spinoza sólo tiene un carácter intelectual abstracto, y no de ejercicio voluntario: cf. E. SCRIBANO, Causalité de la raison et liberté chez Spinoza, "Revue Philosophique de Louvain" 107/4 (2009) pp. 567-582
• F. ENGELS, Anti-Dühring, en K. MARX; F. ENGELS, Werke (Dietz, Berlin, 1972) p. 106
• Cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), § 158
• A este respecto escribió W. JAMES, The Dilemma of Determinism, en The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (The Works of William James, 6: Harvard University Press, Cambridge [Mass.], 1979) p. 117: "Nowadays, we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and, repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, says that its real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity understood, and bondage to the highest is identical with true freedom. [...] Now, all this is a quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of fact has been entirely smothered"
• Cf. ARISTOTELES, Metaphysica, IX 2 1046 a 36 - b 5-8; 5 1047 b 35 - 1048 a 10
• Super Rom., cap. 11. 6: "[sciens] per certitudinem assentit ex necessitate rationis"
• Cf. J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, lib. 2, cap. 21, n. 8 y 11
• Vid., en cambio, THOMAS DE AQUINO, Contra Gentiles, lib. 3, cap. 138, n. 2
• Cf. D. BERTHOLD-BOND, Hegel's Grand Synthesis (Harper, New York, 1993) p. 88
• Así, H. G. FRANKFURT, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, "The Journal of Philosophy" 66/23 (1969) pp. 829-839, defendió que la responsabilidad moral no requiere necesariamente alternativas de actuación
• Para la discusión posterior al respecto, vid. J. LAMB, Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, "The Journal of Philosophy" 90/10 (1993) pp. 517-527
• y D. WIDERKER; M. MCKENNA (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate, Burlington, 2003)
• Señala H. G. FRANKFURT, The Importance of What We Care About, "Synthese" 53/2 (1982) p. 267: "The idea that being rational and loving are ways of achieving freedom ought to puzzle us more than it does, given that both require a person to submit to something which is beyond his voluntary control and which may be indifferent to his desires"
• Por ello, no me parece rigurosa la tesis de que "each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing - or no one - causes us to cause these events to happen". R. M. CHISHOLM, "Human Freedom and the Self", en On Metaphysics (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989) n. 11, p. 12
• Análogamente R. KANE, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996) p. 4
• Cf. S. KIERKEGAARD, Diario, X2 A 428. Ed. italiana de C. Fabro, vol. 7 (3a ed.: Morcelliana, Brescia, 1982) n. 2793, pp. 83-85
• Cf. F. W. J. SCHELLING, Sistema del idealismo trascendental (Anthropos, Barcelona, 2005) § 368, p. 176
• Cf. E. STEIN, Potenz und Akt (Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe, 10: Herder, Freiburg i. Br., 2005) p. 141: "Cuanto más fuertemente es [el ser humano], cuanto más puramente desarrolla su núcleo, tanto menos importan los cambios exteriores"
• Cf. L. POLO, Antropología trascendental, vol. 1 (2a ed.: Eunsa, Pamplona, 2003) p. 85
• R. M. ADAMS, Must God Create the Best?, "Philosophical Review" 81/3 (1972) p. 324: "the gracious person sees what is valuable in the person he loves, and does not worry about whether it is more or less valuable than what could be found in someone else he might have loved. [...] God's graciousness in creating does not imply that the creatures He has chosen to create must be less excellent than the best possible. It implies, rather, that even if they are the best possible creatures, that is not the ground for His choosing them. And it implies that there is nothing in God's nature or character which would require Him to act on the principle of choosing the best possible creatures to be the object of His creative powers"
• G. W. F. HEGEL, The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1991) § 158 Addition, p. 233
• Cf. PS. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, De divinis nominibus, IV 30 (PG 3, 729)
• THOMAS DE AQUINO, Summa Theologiae, I-II q. 19 a. 6 ad 1
• Cf. AVERROES, Epitome in librum Metaphysicae Aristotelis, tract. 1