Los derechos ius-fundamentales como alternativa a la violenciaEntre una teoría lingüística objetiva y una teoría objetiva de la justicia

Abstract

This paper aims at elucidating which, if any, are the limits of creativity in the interpretation of constitutional principles, from the perspective of the conceptual characters of interpretation and of Law, understood as a comprehensive practice which purports to be an alternative, to violence. With this final object, the systematic-teleological method of interpretation is shown as unavoidable, in the light of consideration of laws as acts of speech, and creativity is shown as a necessary consequence of the systematic-theological method of interpretation. Starting from this provisional conclusion. Ronald Dworkin’s attempt to constrain creativity in interpretation is displayed and proposed as a coherent, although circular proposal. The final thesis of this study is that the circularity of interpretation is not necessarily tautological, only if it assumes an objective theory of Justice as points of view for the determination of the meaning of the meaning.