Principios fundamentales e inteligibilidad del Derecho. Entre el realismo semántico y una teoría objetiva del bien y de la acción
ISSN: 0120-8942
Year of publication: 2014
Volume: 23
Issue: 2
Pages: 423-445
Type: Article
More publications in: Díkaion: revista de actualidad jurídica
Abstract
This paper argues that a realistic semantic theory, as proposed by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke, offers an adequate explanation of the significant role of the stated fundamentals. More specifically, it attempts to demonstrate that the priority of the referent over meaning in the semantic order and the priority of understanding over judgment or opinion in the cognitive order are a logical necessity of four generally agreed characteristics of the stated fundamentals: their universal projection, their categorical nature, their pretension of intelligibility, and their pretense of reasonableness. It also argues the assumption of a realistic semantics does not imply linking the stated fundamentals with a theoretical description of human nature, but with basic or rigid types of intentional actions and objects.