A discussion for the metaphysics of downward causationThe case for ontological emergence

Laburpena

The past decades have been marked with an increased venture in understanding and employing the notion of emergence. The notion of emergence argues for the appearance of novel properties known as emergent properties, which are irreducible to their basal properties. A hierarchical structure of levels in reality accompanies the notion of emergence where emergent properties occupy higher levels and basal properties lower levels. In this way, the notion of emergence presents itself as an overt rejection of radical reductionism, which posits that everything can be reduced to the basal properties. Hence, the irreducibility of the emergent properties to the basal properties constitutes the former and the latter separate ontological entities. The dispositions of the emergent properties endow them to cause in the basal properties through what is known as downward causation. However, the irreducibility of emergent properties and downward causation on basal properties have been a source of constant apprehension towards the notion of emergence. This thesis presents a rapprochement for an interpretation of ontological emergence and downward causation that synchronises with our classical notions on ontology and causality. Complexity and an ontology of level based on the constitution rather than the composition of the levels help us explain irreducibility. We have pleaded for the Aristotelian causal pluralism, thus involving the formal and final cause to account for the disquieting problem of downward causation. Hence, we contend that the phenomenon of emergence makes sense within the present scientific and philosophical framework. Keywords: Ontological emergence, Downward causation, Aristotelian causality