Identity, Leibniz's Law and Non-transitive Reasoning

  1. Cobreros, Pablo
  2. Egré, Paul
  3. Ripley, David
  4. Rooij, Robert
Revista:
Metaphysica

ISSN: 1437-2053,  1874-6373

Año de publicación: 2013

Volumen: 14

Número: 2

Páginas: 253-264

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1007/S12133-013-0125-2 GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Metaphysica

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.

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