Husserl y la fenomenología de la negación

  1. Alejandro G. Vigo
Revista:
Investigaciones fenomenológicas: Anuario de la Sociedad Española de Fenomenología

ISSN: 1137-2400,  1885-1088

Any de publicació: 2019

Número: 16

Pàgines: 135-169

Tipus: Article

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Altres publicacions en: Investigaciones fenomenológicas: Anuario de la Sociedad Española de Fenomenología

Resum

Husserl develops a genetic approach that seeks to account for the origin of the logical-categorical forms starting from the corresponding pre-structures located at the level of sensitive receptivity. For such an approach, the explanation of the origin of the modalities of judgment, in general, and negation, in particular, poses peculiar challenges. This paper discusses how Husserl treats negation as a basic form of modality, both in the static approach of Ideen I and the genetic approach of Erfahrung und Urteil. Previously, in order to highlight the historical and systematic significance of the Husserlian conception, a general -presentation of its immediate polemic context is offered, especially with reference to the opposition between psychologism and formalism, dominant in the German philosophy of logic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

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