‘I Can’ vs. ‘I Want’: What’s Missing from Gallagher’s Picture of Non-reductive Cognitive Science

  1. Barrett, Nathaniel F. 1
  2. García-Valdecasas, Miguel 1
  3. Sánchez-Cañizares, Javier 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Navarra
    info

    Universidad de Navarra

    Pamplona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02rxc7m23

Journal:
Australasian Philosophical Review

ISSN: 2474-0500,  2474-0519

Year of publication: 2018

Volume: 2

Issue: 2

Pages: 209-213

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2018.1552099 GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Australasian Philosophical Review

Abstract

We support the development of non-reductive cognitive science and the naturalization of phenomenology for this purpose, and we agree that the 'relational turn' defended by Gallagher is a necessary step in this direction. However, we believe that certain aspects of his relational concept of nature need clarification. In particular, Gallagher does not say whether or how teleology, affect, and other value-related properties of life and mind can be naturalized within this framework. In this paper, we argue that (1) given the phenomenological standards recognized by Gallagher, his commitment to a naturalized phenomenology should entail a commitment to a naturalized concept of value; and (2) the kind of 'relational nature' described by Gallagher in his paper is insufficient for this purpose

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