Aristotle and Kant on Practical Reason. An Annotation to Korsgaard

Laburpena

After many years drawing attention to the differences between Aristotelian and Kantian Ethics, recent scholarship tends to stress their commonaltiesinstead. Among the authors representing this trend of contemporarymoral philosophy, Christine Korsgaard has undoubtedly a leading role.Without denying the differences existing between them, Korsgaard has beenparticularly keen on calling our attention to their shared views.Yet Korsgaard herself has acknowledged an obvious difference between Aristotleand Kant, regarding their approach to emotions : unlike Kant, Aristotledoes not think of inclinations and emotions as mere feelings, but rather asvaluable sources of information about morally salient aspects of our situation.In other words : they provide us with (germinal) reasons for action. Korsgaard, however, keeps this difference at the level of moral psychology, arguingthat it does not make a great difference at the level of ethical theory. Now,this is precisely what I find controversial. My point is that this sort of difference imports a more fundamental one about practical reason in its entirety, a difference which used to be preserved in Kant’s own reference to a “pure practicalreason” – against which Aristotle’s might be called “impure practical reason”.