Aristotle and Kant on Practical Reason. An Annotation to Korsgaard

  1. Ana Marta González 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Navarra
    info

    Universidad de Navarra

    Pamplona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02rxc7m23

Revista:
Acta Philosophica

ISSN: 1121-2179

Año de publicación: 2009

Volumen: 18

Número: 1

Páginas: 99-112

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Acta Philosophica

Resumen

After many years drawing attention to the differences between Aristotelian and Kantian Ethics, recent scholarship tends to stress their commonaltiesinstead. Among the authors representing this trend of contemporarymoral philosophy, Christine Korsgaard has undoubtedly a leading role.Without denying the differences existing between them, Korsgaard has beenparticularly keen on calling our attention to their shared views.Yet Korsgaard herself has acknowledged an obvious difference between Aristotleand Kant, regarding their approach to emotions : unlike Kant, Aristotledoes not think of inclinations and emotions as mere feelings, but rather asvaluable sources of information about morally salient aspects of our situation.In other words : they provide us with (germinal) reasons for action. Korsgaard, however, keeps this difference at the level of moral psychology, arguingthat it does not make a great difference at the level of ethical theory. Now,this is precisely what I find controversial. My point is that this sort of difference imports a more fundamental one about practical reason in its entirety, a difference which used to be preserved in Kant’s own reference to a “pure practicalreason” – against which Aristotle’s might be called “impure practical reason”.